Class of 2024

Hometown: Queens, New York City, New York

Majors: Philosophy and Computer Science
Minor: German

Mellon Project: Rehabilitating the Causal Account of Individualized Evidence

Jurists and philosophers alike have long since known that statistical evidence is insufficient for legal proof. Recent attention on the Problem of Statistical Evidence has concerned itself primarily with Moss’s knowledge and Enoch et al.’s sensitivity accounts of individualized evidence. In this paper, I rehabilitate a third competitor, Thomson’s causal account, with the insights that evidence must bear both an inferential and a type causal relation with a fact to be proved. I show that this revision allows the theory to resist recent criticisms and counterexamples levied by Moss and Blome-Tillman, and I close by offering counterexamples to Moss’s own knowledge account.

Research Interests: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind